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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARENCE P. MARTIN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
RALPH L. JONE.S, dba MOUNT 
AIR PHARMACY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7766 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Martin M. Larson, judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sit-
ting with a jury, on the 16th day of May, 1951. The jury 
entered a verdict in favor of defendant and against plain-
tiff, "no cause of action." Judgment on the verdict was 
entered May 18, 1951. Motion for a new trial was made 
May 24, 1951, and denied September 22, 1951. Notice of 
appeal was filed OctobeT 22, 1951. The facts of the case 
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are substantially as follows : 
On the e.vening of November 11, 1950, about 9 :15 
P.M., plaintiff, his wife and little girl were returning to 
their home after attending a drive-in movie. Plaintiff 
stopped at the Mount Air Pharmacy to make some pur-
chases. Plaintiff parked his car in front of the pharmacy. 
From where plaintiff's car was parked it was possible 
to see into the pharmacy, the front wall of the pharmacy 
being constructed of glass. (R. 42). 
The Mount Air Pharmacy is generally known as a 
modern store which is classified as self-help or semi-self-
help·, however, customers at the prescription room, cash 
register stand, cosmetic counter and liquor bar have to be 
waited on. (R. 123, 124). With the exception of these 
departments, the merchandise displayed in this store on 
the racks, stands, cards and on the tables in· the aisles, 
was· available to the customers to handle and pick up. 
D·efendant testified that they attempted to have sufficient 
personnel to wait on the customers as soon as they 
entered the store. However, the customers had permis-
sion to pick up and examine the various items of dis-
played merchandise. As stated by the witness Cannon, 
"If the customer got there first and picked it up, it was 
okay." (R. 175). See also R. 172, 176, 177, 178, 182, 183 
and photographs, Exhibits F, G, 2, 3, 8 for views of the 
interior of the store and arrangement of merchandise. 
Since there is a dispute in the evidence as to what 
occurred at the time plaintiff entered the store, the testi-
mony of the various witnesses will be given. 
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Plaintiff testified that he went in the pharmacy and 
asked for some NRA tablets and some razor blades which 
they gave hin1 and he paid for. He then asked for a pencil 
and was told they were on top of the shelf behind the 
liquor counter. See defendant's Exhibit 2. Plaintiff re-
marked to the clerk that he would get one and the clerk 
went with him behind the liquor counter to get the. pencil. 
(R. 44-4 7 inclusive). Plaintiff further testified that he 
did not observe any signs, nor was anything said to him 
about not going behind the liquor counter. (R. 47). Plain-
tiff testified that he noticed nothing unusual about the 
floor. He reached up to get a pencil from the card on 
which the pencils were located and as he reached he took 
a step over and was suddenly plummeted into the base-
ment of the pharmacy. (R. 48). 
Mrs. Aletha G. Cannon, one of defendant's witnesses 
and a clerk on duty at the pharmacy the night of the 
accident, testified that her attention was first called to 
the presence of plaintiff in the pharmacy when Mrs. 
Ashley, another clerk, called to her and asked her to 
bring some tablets from the rear of the store for plaintiff. 
At that time plaintiff- was by the cash register. (R. 171). 
She testified further that she left the tablets there by 
the cash register and when she turned around plaintiff 
was standing over behind the liquor counter. She testi-
fied she did not see plaintiff walk from the cash register 
over to the liquor counter. 
Witness Cannon testified, "Well, bein.g responsible 
for the liquor man, I walked over and asked plaintiff i_f 
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I could help him." Plaintiff remarked that he wanted a 
pencil. Witness Cannon further testified, "He got a pen-
cil off a card and then turned and put the card back on 
the shelf and stepped back and fell down the hole." (R. 
172'). 
With respect to the elevator shaft, Witness Cannon 
further testified: (R. 17 4) 
"Q. Do you know whether that hoJe was open at 
the time this accident happ·ened ~ 
A. Yes, it was. I walked ove.r behind Mr. Martin. 
I saw him fall dorwn. 
Q. Did you see the hole before he fell~ 
A. Yes, I had been behind the counter many 
times ; personal articles were under the cash 
register." 
Witness Cannon further testified : (R. 179-181) 
"Q. Mrs. c·annon, did you say anything to Mr. 
Martin when you went over there, about not 
being behind the liquor counter~ 
A. No, we try to be as courteous to the customers 
as we can. We do not say, 'You are not al-
lowed behind here.' We try to get them out 
as nicely as we can. 
Q. You did not ask him to leave~ 
A. No, I figured on helping him and getting him 
out as quickly as I could without hurting his 
·feelings. 
Q. So in the interest of your employer you 
thought there wasn't any necessity of asking 
him to come away from that particular area~ 
A. As long as I was there with him. 
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Q. Mrs. Cannon did you warn him of any danger 
in that vicinity~ 
A. Well the hole was there. I figured ·he could 
see it. 
Q. You could see it~ 
A. And he did not have his back to it. 
Q. He had his face to it~ 
A. He was to the side of it; he was not standing 
right by it~ 
Q. The light was good so you could see the hole 
there~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now then, you said not a word to him about 
that~ 
A. No, I didn't. I figured he could see it. 
Q. Mrs. Cannon, those pencils that were there, 
Mr. Martin reached up and got, are about 7 
feet above the floor, are they not~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And Mr. Martin reached up there and got 
those and brought them down and selected a 
pencil~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Am I correct in that~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Mrs. Cannon was there - there wasn't any 
stumbling or catching by Mr. Martin before 
he went through; he just stepped into the 
hole and went through, didn't he:~ 
A. I couldn't say; I wasn't watching his feet at 
the time. 
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Q. · You· were right at the side of him for how 
long before he went through this hole~ 
A .. Just a few minutes." 
.Mrs. ·Raedell Ashley, a witness of the defendant and 
the -othe.r cle!rk on duty the night of the accident, testi-
fied that she waited ·on plaintiff and he purchased some 
NRA tablets and some razor blades ; that as far as she 
knew plaintiff was completely finished and did not ask 
for any pencils. (R. 186). The first intimation she had 
of the accident was when she heard bottles rattle on the 
shelf in the liquor department. She turned around and 
saw Mrs. Cannon standing there with her hands in the 
air and plaintiff had fallen. (R. 187). Witness Ashley 
testified, "I ran over there and looked in this shaft, and it 
looked as though he stepped into the hoJe; his hands and 
feet were up, and he was resting on his lower back. (R. 
187). 
U·p~n examination it appeared that plaintiff feU 
through an elevator or dumb-waiter shaft which opened 
into the basement of the building. The distance from the 
floor to the basement, the distance of plaintiff's fall, was 
about 8 to 10 feet. (R. 49). The hole in the floor where 
the elevator or dumb-waiter would come up·, was about 
two feet square. (R. 76). Defendant's witnesses testified 
there was a moulding around the hole about four inches 
wide 'and that rose above the floor about one· inch. (R. 
142). There was no cover for the hole but rather, when 
not in use, the elevator would be wound up and the plat-
form of the elevator would become p-art of the floor 
above. (R. 143, 179). The platform of the elevator did 
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not come up even with the floor but was about three and 
one-half inches below the floor when it was wound up. 
(R. 143). The platform in this position was used as a 
part of the floor and was fastened in the up position with 
a hook or rachet on the elevator mechanism. (R. 43, 89). 
lllr. vVilliam L. Collins, elevator inspector for the 
State of Utah, inspected this elevator or dumb-waiter on 
N oven1ber 13, 1950, just two days after the accident oc-
curred. He testified that the only safety mechanism 
for holding the elevator up in the position at the top, 
was the mechanical latch that locked the rachet. (R. 86, 
89, 90). Mr. Collins further testified that his inspection 
of November 13, 1950, was in the regular course of his 
work as state inspector to ascertain if said elevator or 
dumb-waiter complied with the accepted standard code. 
(R. 92, 93). Mr. Collins testified: (R. 95-96) 
"A. My opinion is stated in my re·ports. I classi-
fied it as a 'makeshift affair.' I think it was 
hazardous because of the termination o[ it 
being with the floor. Usually a dumb-waiter 
is elevated above the top floor, or the height 
of it is limited to the floor level, to the top 
of the door of the enclosure, and the structure 
of the hatch, that 'vas entirely out of line I 
thought,-
• . . 
A. I could see the windlass was anchored down 
with nails, very easily pulled out. The. cable 
was not secured, from my inspection of other 
elevators of this type, in the proper manner,-
• . . 
A. -the elevator being a part of the floor was 
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: hazardous, no indications that an elevator· is 
there.''. 
'Mr. Collins further testified there was no s1gn or 
indication in the vicinity of the dumb-waiter warning .of 
the presence of such a device~ ( R. 94) . 
. ·The pencils· which plaintiff sO.ught to purchase were 
located on. the: shelf behind the liquor counter. See photo-
·. graph,. Exhibit 2. .Some of 'the pencils on that particular 
card were missing and evidently had been sold from 
that location behind the liquor counter. (R. 191, 192). 
Plaintiff testified that he observed no signs indicat-
ing he was not supposed .to go behind the liquor co~nter. 
D·~fend~t's testimony and that of his witnesses was that 
there was a sign on the end of the liquor counter at the 
time of the accident which re-ad, "No admittance, Em-
ploye.es only." See· photographs, Exhibits 3 and 8. 
A~ a re.sult of said fall, plain tiff suffered a broken 
back artd other s~vere ·injury; was hospitalized and 
.place(l in a cast for six weeks; required to wear a brace; 
and suffered seve.re pain and suffering in conjunction 
with hi~ broken back and other injuries. 
S.TATEMENT OF POINTS 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY, (INSTRUCTION· NO.· 9) AND ERRE'J::> IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION .. FOR A NEW· TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
Instructi<ni No. 9 given by the; court and duly ob-
. j:eeted to .bY plaintiff (R. 258-261) presents serious and 
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prejudicial error in this case. Said imprope·r instruction 
was the basis of plaintiff's argument for a new trial, 
which the court denied. Instruction No. 9 reads as fol-
lows (R. 248): 
"If you find th·at the aisle behind the liquor 
counter was not intended for and was not a place 
used by customers and patrons of defendant and 
was intended and used only as a working area for 
use by defendant's employe.es, and that plainly 
visible signs were posted signifying the area was 
not for customers, and if you further find that 
plaintiff walked behind said counter to the vicinity 
of said opening, without the direction or consent 
of the defendant or his employees, then you are 
instructed that in walking behind said counter, 
plaintiff was a trespasser and took the premises 
as he found them, and defendant owed him no duty 
whatever with respect to the existence of the open-
ing, except to not wilfully or knowingly injure 
him, and he is not entitled to recover, and your 
verdict must be in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff, No Cause of Action." 
Plaintiff's contention is that the above quoted in-
struction was erroneous and prejudicial for the reason 
that it instructs the jury that plaintiff was, under the 
law, a trespasser, regardless of the circumstances or 
conditions that existed, while plaintiff was behind the 
liquor counter. That by defining plaintiff as a trespasser, 
the duty of care owed to him by defendant was negligi-
ble except that defendant could not wilfully or knowing-
ly injure him. The court in giving this instruction, dis-
regarded the facts as presented in the case and therefore 
precluded plaintiff from recovering. Plaintiff has set 
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forth in his Statement of F'acts the testimony of the two 
clerks who were on duty in the pharmacy at the time of 
the accident_:and,furthermore, the testimony of plaintiff. 
Regardless otf the status of plaintiff at the time he walked 
.b~hind the liquor counter and,. con~idering the facts in 
the: light of the most favorable to defendant, plaintiff was 
not a trespasser a.t the time he was served by Mrs. Can-
non, an employee, behind the liquor counter. 
The evi4ence ·as presented by defendant's own wit-
nesses and particularly Mrs. Aletha G. Cannon, who 
was an eye-witness to the accident, shows conclusively 
that pl'airi.tiff was not a trespasser. at the time he was 
served behind the liquor counter. The testimony of Mrs. 
c·annon is set forth in some detail in plaintiff's Statement 
of F'acts, but the essence of it is that at the time she saw 
plaintiff behind the liquor counter,· she walked over and 
asked· plaintiff if she could help him. She did not ask 
him to. leave or explain to him that he was not allowed 
behind the. liquor counter, but merely served him in the 
same manner that she would had he been in another part 
of the store:. It should be remembered that the pharmacy 
in question was a self-help or semi self-help store. The 
defendant testified that he attempted to have sufficient 
personnel to serve each customer, however, it w~s per-
missible for the customers to pick up and examine the 
merchandise on the self-help or semi self-help· counters. 
Mrs. Cannon further testified that she did not warn 
plaintiff of the hole or elevator shaft in the floor; a;nd 
that in the interest of her employer she did not con-
sider it necessary, as long as she was there wi'th him, to 
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ask him to co·me away from that particular area. It is ap-
parent since plaintiff 'vas there to purehase a p·encil and 
did secure a pencil from the display card with Mrs. Can-
non's assistance, that he was there- for the direct benefit 
of both plaintiff and defendant and in connection with the 
business of defendant and, therefore, plaintiff was an 
invitee, or business visitor. There can be no argument 
that the clerk, ~Irs. Cannon, who waited on plaintiff be-
hind the liquor counter, had the apparent authority to 
serve plaintiff as a customer in that area of the store 
as her position would certainly lend credence to such a 
proposition. Se-e SKERL v. WILLOW CREEK COAL 
CO., 92 Utah 474; 69 P. 2d 502 
This court in the case of In Re WIMMER'S ES-
TATE, 111 Utah 444, 449; 182 P. 2d 119, gave the follow-
ing definitions: 
"* * * We elect to adopt the classification 
used in the Restatement of the Law, that is tres-
passer, licensee or business visitor. 
"For definitions used in this opinion, see Re-
statement of the Law, Torts, Paragraphs 329, 
330, 332. A trespasser is defined as 'a person who 
enters or remains upon land· in possession of an-
other without a privilege to do so created by the 
possessor's consent, or otherwise.' A licensee is 
defined 'u person who is privileged to enter or re-
main upon land by virtue of the possessor's con-
sent, whether given by invitation or permission.' 
A business visitor is 'a person who is invited or 
per1nitted to enter or remain on land in the pos-
session of another for a purpose direetly or in-
directly connected with dealings between them 
* * * ' " (Italics added.) 
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The definition of a business visitor given by this 
court would include plaintiff, as he remained behind the 
liquor counter, served by an employee or agent of the 
defendant, for a purpose directly connected with deal-
ings between them. It is not ne.cessary that an express 
invitation be given, but such invitation to enter or re-
main may be implied, or may exist from such circum-
stances as the conduct of the defendant or his agent, the 
arrangement of the pre·mises, etc. See OETTINGEl~ 
v. STEWART, 1944, 24 C. 2d 133, 137; 148 P. 2d 19. 
In the case of HAYWARD v. DOWNING, ET AL, 
112 Utah 508, 513-515, 189 P. 2d 442, the following situ-
ation was presented to this court : 
The defendant in this case conducted wrestling and 
boxing matches in the coliseum building at the State Fair 
Grounds. The matches were held on a stage or platforn1 
in the center of the coliseum building. The seats ex-
tended out from the stage or platform in all directions. 
On the east wall of the building there was a small plat-
form or balcony above the last row of seats. There were 
no stairs or steps or ordinary device by which this plat-
form could be reached. The plaintiffs in this case would 
come early and purchase tickets to the show and then 
se.cure permission from Mr. Downing to sit upon this 
platform. They would gain access to this platform by 
grasping an iron beam and swinging up "tarzan-like" 
onto the platform. On this particular night the platforE! 
collapsed and fell to the floor and the plaintiffs were 
injured. The trial court, upon motion of the defendants, 
ordered non-suits, apparently on the ground that the 
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plaintiffs were at 1nost licensees. This court, however, 
reversed the lower court and ordered a new trial. The 
platforn1 in this particular case was not used except when 
used by these plaintiffs. rrhis court stated: 
"It is undisputed that when plaintiffs ·pur-
chased tickets and entered the coliseum building 
they came as invitees and not as licensees. The 
only question is as to the extent of their invita-
tion-was it limited to the regular seats, or would 
it include also the platfonn upon which plaintiffs 
were sitting at the time they were injured~ 
"We think this case is more like Hupfer v. 
National Distilling Co., 114 Wis. 279,90 N. W. 191. 
In that case, plaintiff's intestate purchased slop 
from defendant for swine feed. The slop was in a 
large vat. Defendant hired a man to stir the slop· 
for purchasers, but decedent insisted on stirring 
the slop himself, so that he could be sure that he 
got 'thick slop.' Defendant permitted decende.ntto 
stir the slop himself, so that it would not lose· de-
cedent's trade. While decedent was standing on 
a platform stirring the slop, the vat burst, and 
he was scalded to death. It was adn1itted that 
decedent was an invitee on defendant's premises, 
but defendant contended that when decedent 
mounted the platform, he was, at most, a licensee 
while on the platform. The Wisconsin court took 
the view that decedent was an invitee, even upon 
the platform. Defendant benefited from deced-
ent's being on the platform in that by permitting 
-.,decedent to stir the slop himself, defendant re-
tained his trade and good will. See Harper on 
Torts, Sec. 98 at p. 228. In the case at bar it may 
be well argued that defendants benefited by per-
mitting the. Bountiful boys to sit upon the plat-
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form in that they secured the good will and con-
tinued patronage of those boys, including the two 
plaintiffs. 
• >!It • • 
"Our holding is limited strictly to the facts of 
this case-where an invitee as to one part of the 
premises, receives permission to go upon another 
part of the premises in furtherance of the. object 
or purpose for which he was originally invited 
upon the premises (in this case, to view the wres-
tling matches) he becomes an invitee as to such 
second part of the premises. As to other and dif-
ferent fact situations, we express no opinion." 
There· can be no question but that plaintiff was 
impliedly invited by the actions of Mrs. Cannon, the 
employee of defendant, to remain behind the liquor 
counter and to purchase a pencil. She stated in her testi-
monythat she did not tell him to leave the area but helped 
him to secure his purchase. In other words, she desired 
to retain the. good will of the plaintiff and to sell him the 
item of merchandise which he desired. 
This court further stated in the ease of Hayward v. 
Downing quoted supra, at page 513 : 
"An invitee is ordinarily one who goes upon 
the premises of the owner or occupant for the pur-
pose of transacting business, or for the mutual 
benefit of each of them, or for the benefit of the 
occupant. He may be expressly invited to come 
upon the premises, but more commonly his invita-
tion is implied. The operator of a store, public 
amusement place, shop, or business office im-
pliedly invites the general public to enter and pur-
chase. whatever goods or services he offers for 
sale. A licensee, on the other hand, is one who 
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enters with the express or implied permission of 
the owner, for his own advantage, and not for any 
advantage of the owner or occupant. For collec-
tion of cases distinguishing between invitees and 
licensees see Vol. 22, Words and Phrases, Pe.rm. 
Ed., pages 575-581.'' 
It is apparent that plaintiff was upon the p·remises 
of the defendant for the mutual benefit of each of them, 
and that Mrs. Cannon, an employee of defend·ant, im-
pliedly invited plaintiff to remain behind the liquor 
counter to serve him in the purchase of a p·encil. There 
certainly is no justification for denominating plaintiff 
a trespasser under these particular circumstances, yet 
the court in its instruction has enti:r;ely disregarded the 
factors which occurred after plaintiff entered the aisle 
behind the liquor counter. 
There is no question concerning the proposition that 
one who invites another to come upon his premises for 
some purpose of interest or advantage to him, owes to 
such other person a duty to use ordinary care to have his 
premises in a reasonably safe· condition. Furthe-rmore, 
this includes the duty to warn of latent or concealed de-
fects known to the occupant. The elevator shaft was 
an extremely dangerous condition and, as testified to by 
Mr. Collins, the state insp·ector, it was "but a make-shift 
affair." 
It is probably not good policy to quote portions of a 
dissenting opinion. However, plaintiff fe.els that this is 
an exception. Justice .W'olfe in the case of BIRD V. 
CLOVER LEAF-HARRIS DAIRY, 102 Utah 330, 125 P. 
2d 797, in his dissenting opinion, stated: 
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"* * * An examination of many cases will re-
veal that when the property orwner has maintained 
on his property a condition inherently or patently 
dangerous and the traveler on the property is 
there not who~ly without reason or excuse, the 
courts have attempted if possible to guide the fac-
tual situation into the classification which im-
poses on the owner the duty toward the traveler 
which will require an abatement as to him of such 
p-atently or inherently dangerous conditi'On. Thus 
there was a judicial manipulation of these two 
variables of relationship of the traveler and the 
typH of negligence of the owner or perhaps more 
accurately stated, the factual situations were 
guided wherever possible into the conceptual 
framework which would exact of the owner the 
duty which under all the facts of the case se,emed 
to fulfill the requirements of justice. And the 
courts have not indulged in great squeamishness 
in keeping the matter of the owner's liability from 
the jury by differentiating in borderline cases 
between an invitee and a licensee in order that 
the negligent owner might reap the benefit of a 
happy chance that his neglect injured a licensee 
rather than an invitee. Unless the presence of the 
victim itself is negligence the negligence has been 
purely that of the owner. And when, for example, 
the unfortunate victim arises amid the rubble of 
a dilapidated wall which fell due to the neglect of 
its owner, the courts have not indulged in fine 
distinctions to exculpate from responsibility the 
owner who maintains such a condition. Barry v. 
Ne,w York Central & H.R.R. Co., 1883, 92 N. Y. 
289, 44 Am. Rep. 377; Sweeny v. Old Colony & 
Newport R. Co., 1865, 10 Allen, Mass., 368, 87 
Am. Dec. 644; Herrick v. Wixom, 1899, 121 Mich. 
384, 80 N. W. 117, 81 N. W. 333; Fitzpatrick v. 
Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co., 1898, 61 N. J. L. 378, 
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39 A. 675; lJnion Stock Yards & Transit Co. v. 
Rourke, 10 Ill. .A.pp. 4 7 4 ; Palmer v. Gordon, 173 
~fass. 410, 53 N. E. 909, 73 Am. St. Rep. 302." 
Certainly, in this case, the. dereliction of defendant 
in failing to n1aintain safe conditions in his pharmacy 
cannot be condoned by the legal reasoning that because 
of technical distinctions plaintiff was more in the cate-
gory of trespasser than invitee or business visitor, there-
fore plaintiff cannot recover for his injuries. Would that 
appear to fulfill the requirements of justice~ 
To anticipate the argument of defendant and par-
ticularly with reference to the que·stion of contributory 
negligence, there is no evidence upon which the court 
could say, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was guilty o~ 
contributory negligence. The duty of care owed plain-
tiff, an invitee, is such that plaintiff need not expect or 
anticipate, without warning, that the conditions on the 
premises are such that dangerous instrumentalities, such 
as the elevator shaft, existed. It has been held in a num-
ber of California cases, and with good reason, that a cus-
tomer who enters a store to secure a purchase of some 
item of merchandise, may properly give his attention to 
the display of goods, etc., and need not watch the floor. 
See Wills v. Newberry Co., 1941, 43 CA 2d 595, 111 P. 
2d 346. Se also Thompson v. Goodrich Co., 1941, 48 C.A. 
2d 723 at 727, 120 P. 2d 693. See also Neel v. Mannings, 
1942, 19 C 2d 647, 122 P. 2d 756. 
In the case of OETTINGER V. S·TEWART, cited 
supra, an erroneous instruction regarding trespass was 
given, and with reference to the question whether the 
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judgment should be sustained even though an erroneous 
instruction in this regard was given, the California court 
had this to say : 
"It should be noted that there is some evi-
dence of plaintiff's contributory negligence, but 
we cannot say that the record shows contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. The issue was one 
of fact for the jury to determine. It cannort be 
assumed under the circumstances of this case 
that the jury's verdict for defendant was based on 
the evidence of contributory negligence alone. It 
may well have been predicated upon a theory of 
defense permitted by one or more of the erron-
eous instructions discussed above. As stated in 
O'Meara v. Swortfield, 191 C 12, 15; 214 P. 975, 
976, 'It is true that in determining whether or not 
a verdict is supported by the evidence we 1nust 
assume that the jury accepted the view most 
favorable to the respondent. However, in deter-
mining whether or not the instructions given are 
correct, we must assume that the jury might have 
believed the evidence upon which the instruction 
unfavorable to the losing party was predicated, and 
that if the correet instruction had been given up-
on that subject, the jury might have rendered a 
verdict in favor of the losing party. See Young 
v. Southern Pacific Co., 182 C 369, 382-384, 190 P. 
36; Criswell v. Pacific Electric Railway Co., 48 
CA 2d 819, 823, 824; 120 P. 2d 670; Gelloway v. 
United Railroads, 69 CA 770, 774, 232 P. 491. In 
cases where it clearly appears that the jury did 
not rely upon the erroneous instructions, the judg-
ment may be affirmed on the ground that the 
error is not p·rejudicial. This, however, is not such 
a case. Neither the evidence of contributory negli-
gence, nor of negligence, although sufficient as a 
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matter of law,. can be said to be convincing, and 
we should not speculate upon the basis otf the ver-
dict.' " (Italics added.) 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, plaintiff asserts that the court in In-
struction No. 9 has precluded the jury from considering 
all of the factual evidence that occurred at the time. plain-
tiff went to the aisle behind the liquor counter. In view 
of the fact that plaintiff was served by one of the 
employees of defendant, was not asked to leave, was not 
warned of any dangerous instrumentality, i.e., the ele-
vator shaft, defendant owed to plaintiff a greater duty 
of care than that owed to a trespasser. That had the 
court's instruction properly set forth the law with regard 
to invitees and trespassers the jury could not, under any 
circumstances, have found the plaintiff to have. been a 
trespasser. Instruction No. 9 is prejudicial for the reason 
that it decides the very fact in issue, that is, the duty of 
care owed by defendant to plaintiff, and does not le-ave 
to the jury the prerogative of viewing all the facts and 
particularly that which occurred when plaintiff was 
served in the aisle behind the liquor counter in the usual 
manner by one of defendant's employees. Judgment for 
defendant should be reversed and a new trial granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCuLLOUGH, BoYCE & McCULLOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellwnt 
417 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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